I’ve previously given my executive summary of the actions we need to take  in Iraq. Now I’ll summarize the Iraq Study Group’s recommendation: We need to go forth and make nice with any and everyone to convince them that we all just need to get along.

I don’t believe I have ever seen a more pedestrian product come from such a supposedly august body. They cavalierly propose simplistic approaches to extremely complex problems: Iran’s and Syria’s interference in the region; the Arab/Israeli problem. They base their recommendations on unsupported assumptions. The report comes across as a whole lot of wishful thinking and not much substance. Some excerpts from the report’s executive summary and my comments follow.

The policies and actions of Iraq’s neighbors greatly affect its stability and prosperity. No country in the region will benefit in the long term from a chaotic Iraq. Yet Iraq’s neighbors are not doing enough to help Iraq achieve stability. Some are undercutting stability.

This is an example of the pervasive flawed logic in the report. It says that no country will benefit in the long term from a chaotic Iraq. But what about in the short term? What is their definition of long term? Iran may not be trying to help Iraq achieve stability now because they know that they will benefit more in the long term if the US fails and they then move in and save Iraq, or they at least save the Shiites.

Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the United States should try to engage them constructively.

The ISG presses on with the unsound assumption that Iran and Syria have an “interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq.” Even if they do want to avoid chaos in Iraq it doesn’t mean that they want to help the US — unless they get huge concessions.

The United States must adjust its role in Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of their own destiny.

I thought that was our role since shortly after the fall of the Saddam regime. In fact, I have been critical of that role because I think that we should have taken control of the country and maintained control until it was stable and then installed an Iraqi government.

By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq.

Not necessary for force protection? They must expect a lot of progress by 2008. The 140,000 troops there now aren’t able to protect themselves.

It is the unanimous view of the Iraq Study Group that these recommendations offer a new way forward for the United States in Iraq and the region. They are comprehensive and need to be implemented in a coordinated fashion. They should not be separated or carried out in isolation.

Translation: We’ve done all the thinking that needs to be done. Mere mortals should not dare to mess with our work. Sorry guys, I’m ROFL. We can only hope that someone in the Administration does take it apart — or they ignore it completely.